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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOSHITARO OKUDA and JACK 
ARAMAKI, the sole heirs 
of KIM ARAMAKI OKUDA, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 8399 
-vs.-
JERRY A. ROSE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought to recover for the 
death of Kim Aramaki Okuda by reason of an auto-
pedestrian accident. The case was tried before a jury 
which returned a verdict of no cause in favor of 
the defendant and respondent. The evidence shows 
that the deceased was killed when struck by an 
automobile driven by the defendant at about 1:30 
A.M. the morning of October 25, 1953, at about 
2200 South Main Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
There was no evidenee of the deceased's activities 
immediately before the accident or how she came 
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to be in the street where she was struck, except 
that she was struck at a point in the street any-
where from six to fifteen feet from the west side 
of the street and was not in a crosswalk or at an 
intersection at the time. In fact the jury could have 
found that she was hit at a point directly in the 
defendant's lane of travel, that being the outside 
lane for southbound traffic. One of the questions 
presented by this appeal is whether the court erred 
under this evidence in instructing the jury as to 
the deceased's right to be on the highway and her 
duties while on the highway. The other question 
raised by this appeal is whether the court under 
this evidence should have instructed the jury that 
the deceased was presumed to be exercising due 
care for her ow11 safety at the time of the accident. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set out in appellants' brief are sub-
,stantially correct -and we will discuss them only 
briefly except in those particulars wherein we dif-
fer and when we consider the difference material 
to the issues before this court. 
Mrs. Kim Aramaki Okuda, a lady of Japanese 
descent, seventy-five years of age, had been visiting 
friends and relatives in Salt Lake City on the Satur-
day prior to the morning on which this accident 
occurred. Saturday evening she had attended a Ja-
panese meeting at a Buddhist Church in Salt Lake 
. ) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
City and had then gone to Magna, Utah to visit 
her sister. Her sister's son, Saige Ararnaki, brought 
Mrs. Okuda back to Salt Lake and let her out of 
his automobile on First South Street between West 
Temple and First West Streets at about 11:00 P.M. 
Where she intended to go when she left Saige Ara-
maki's car is not known, except that there is a 
Chinese or Japanese cafe at 1281;2 West First South 
Street and she was staying just around the corner 
at 33lj2 South Temple, where her husband was wait-
ing for her at the time (R.30). IIo\v this lady, who 
could not speak English and had no reason to be 
in that neighborhood, came to be at 2200 South 
Main Street, a point four or five miles from where 
she was let out of Saige Aramaki's automobile two 
and a half hours before, remains a mystery ( R.30-
32). 
The defendant, Jerry A. Rose, whose job as 
rate clerk for the Interstate Motor Lines required 
that he work irregular hours, had left work about 
1:00 P.M. Saturday afternoon (R. 74). On the way 
home, he bought a pint of whiskey and arrived at 
his home in Murray, Utah about 2:30 or 3:00 P.M. 
in the afternoon. He and his wife spent the after-
noon at horne, with perhaps an excursion to the 
grocery store, and had had dinner at home before 
going out that evening at about 8 :30 or 9 :00 P.M. 
During the course of the afternoon and evening, 
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the defendant and his wife had consumed about one-
half of the bottle of liquor. At about 8:30 or 9:00 
P.M., the defendant and his wife went to the Man-
hattan Club in Salt Lake City, where they remained 
until about 1:00 A.M. Sunday morning. Dtlring the 
time they were at the Club, they consumed the rest 
of the bottle of liquor. 
From the Manhattan Club, the couple drove 
south on Main Street to the intersection of Twenty-
First South and Main Streets, where they stopped 
for a red light (R. 81). 
Main Street, below Twenty-First South in the 
vicinity of this accident, is approximately seventy 
feet wide. There is a paved street approximately 
forty feet wide down the center of the street, with 
fifteen feet of gravel shoulders on either side of the 
pavement. The paved portion of the highway is 
marked off into four ten foot traffic lanes, two 
for northbound traffic and two for southbound traf-
fic. There is a sidewalk, at least on the west side 
of the street. The Lennox Furnace Company is lo-
cated on the west side of the street immediately 
across from where the deceased was hit. (See dia-
gram in appellant's brief). The nearest intersection 
is one-half block away (R. 94) and the nearest street 
light a block a way ( R. 93) . The area then was 
relatively dark. It was raining and visibility was 
poor (R. 93). There was no crosswalk in the vicinity 
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where the accident occurred (R. 94), and the 
defendant had the lights of his automobile turned 
on. 
As the traffic signal changed to green, the 
defendant proceeded south on Main Street in the 
outside lane for southbound traffic. As he and his 
wife proceeded south, a gray two-toned automobile, 
which the defendant thought was a 1950 or 1952 
Buick (R. 81), pulled up alongside defendant's auto-
mobile. The occupants of this automobile were mak-
ing a lot of noise, shouting to or at ope another 
and there was a great deal of commotion going on 
in the car (R. 117, 82). As this automobile passed 
defendant's automobile an object struck defendant's 
windshield immediately in front of and about three 
inches above the steering wheel. The defendant 
ducked and at the same moment heard a thud, which 
appeared to come from the rear of the car ( R. 94). 
Thinking that he might have hit something or had 
dropped a wheel into a hole in the street, the de-
fendant stopped his car to investigate ( R. 86). 
Going back to the point where he heard the thud, 
the defendant found Mrs. Okuda lying to the side 
of the road ( R. 86). The woman was clothed en-
tirely in black and was lying more or less east and 
west approximately three feet from the paved por-
tion of the highway. 
Mrs. Jerry Rose substantiated her husband's 
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story asserting as her husband had done that their 
car was still on the paved portion of the highway 
at the time she heard the thud. She asserted that the 
body was lying about four feet from the paved 
surface out onto the shoulder. There were various 
articles of clothing lying about, a shoe being three 
or four feet from the body, a black handbag lying 
ten to twelve feet to the right and north of the body 
upon the pavement, another shoe on the paved por-
tion of the highway, and some weeds (herbs) in 
a bread wrapper lying about (R. 118). 
After what seemed five to ten minutes, a boy 
came along and the defendant sent him to get an 
ambulance (R. 119). After that a crowd gathered 
in which the witness, Mrs. Rose, noticed a person 
of Japanese ancestry. She spoke to this person, and 
asked him if he knew the deceased, which he denied. 
Another mysterious circumstance was that she 
noticed in the cars which gathered after the acci-
dent, a gray sedan automoblie similar to the one that 
had passed them immediately before the accident. 
(R. 122). 
The first police officers at the scene were from 
South Salt Lake. Lawrence J. Vaughan, one of 
the officers, testified that he was chasing another 
car north on Main Street when they noticed the 
accident and turned around and returned to the 
scene (R. 51). This was about 1:45 A.M. After 
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testifying to the physical surroundings, he testified 
he found the body about six feet out from the side-
walk and about forty-five feet from a sign on the 
side of the road. He further testified that he ex-
amined defendant's automobile and found a dent 
on the rim of the headlight on the right side and 
some brush marks on the outside of the right hand 
fender ( R. 41). The defendant voluntarily submit-
ted to a blood test and it was found to be .034 of one 
percent alcoholic content (R. 60). 
Two other police officers fron1 South Salt Lake 
testified substantially in the same manner. The wit-
ness Charles Bowden testified that he observed the 
position of the deceased's body and that no part 
of her body was at that time any closer to the side-
walk than six feet ( R. 73). 
The High\vay Patrolman, Robert D. Nuttal, 
arrived at the scene of the accident some time later. 
When he arrived, the body had already been moved 
(R. 36). He testified that he observed the marks on 
the right front fender of the defendant's car, and 
also observed a mark on the windshield of the de-
fendant's car as if a rock or some other object had 
struck it (R. 40-45). 
The defendant testified that almost a year pre-
viously he had had an accident involving the right 
front fender of his car. After this prior accident, 
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his car had been repaired, but he had never observed 
the right front fender in detail and did not know 
whether the marks on the fender testified to by the 
police officers were there prior to this night or not 
(R. 104). The defendant gave the investigating of-
a statement, which appears in appellant's brief and 
which is in accord with his testimony herein, to the 
effect that he was driving along south Main Street 
south of Twenty-First South when something hit 
his windshield immediately after a car had passed 
him. The object chipped his windshield and he pulled 
to the right and heard another dull sound. Being in 
doubt as to what had made the sound, he stopped 
his car and got out to see vvhat the trouble was, 
when he found the woman and various articles on 
the road. The woman was injured, and he had in-
structed the first car that stopped to call the police 
and ambulance. 
The jury was instructed by the court, whose 
instructions appear on pages 150 to 165, and after 
deliberating, returned a verdict in the defendant's 
favor of no cause of action. 
This appeal is addressed to the giving of one 
instruction and the failure to give another, which 
we will discuss in that order. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN GIV-
ING INSTRUCTION NO. 7 PERTAINING TO TI-lE 
.iRULES OF LAW GOVERNING PERSONS ON HIGH-
WAYS. 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT TI-IE DECE-
DENT WAS PRESUJ\1ED TO BE EXERCISING DUE 
CARE AT Tl-IE TIME OF HER DEATH. 
ARGUMENT 
POil~T I. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN GIV-
ING INSTRUCTION NO. 7 PERTAINING TO THE 
RULES OF LAW GOVERNING PERSONS ON HIGH-
WAYS. 
The instructions to the jury in this case fol-
lo-\v the usual pa tterne First the jury is instructed 
as to the claims and allegations of the parties and 
the burden of proof. !~ext the general terms, "negli-
gence," "contributory negligence," and "proximate 
cause" are defined. Then the jury is instructed as 
to specific claims of negligence. In this regard, 
Instruction No. 6 instructed the jury that the de-
fendant in the operation of his automobile was re-
quired to operate the same in accordance with the 
follovving: 
"1. You are instructed that a driver 
shall not turn a vehicle from the traveled 
course on a highway unless he first ascertains 
that such movement can be made with reason-
able safety. 
"2. You are instructed that a driver of 
a vehicle upon a highway is required to main-
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tain and keep a proper lookout for other ve-
hicles and pedestrians upon the highway, so 
as to avoid colliding with other persons on the 
highway or persons standing next to the tra-
veled portion of the same when such person 
sees, or in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should observe those persons. In this connec-
tion it is no excuse for a driver to say that he 
did not see, if in the exercise of reasonable 
care he should have seen. 
"3. You are instructed that every dri-
ver of an automobile shall operate the same 
so that he has said automobile under safe, 
proper, and immediate control, so as to avoid 
colliding with other vehicles or pedestrians 
lawfully using the highway. 
"4. You are instructed that is is un-
lawful for the driver of a motor vehicle to 
operate the same while said driver is under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor and, in 
this connection, you are instructed that such 
driver is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor when he has consumed the same to the 
extent that it appreciably affects his mental 
or physical faculties in the operation of said 
automobile." 
Instruction No. 7, which is complained of by 
the appellants, was as follows: 
''Instruction No. 7. You are instructed 
that the deceased in the exercise of ordinary 
care, and in order not to be guilty herself of 
contributory negligence, was governed by the 
following rules of law at the time and place 
in question. 
"1. You are instructed that it was the 
10 
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duty of the deceased in undertaking to cross 
the highway, if you should believe that she 
was so doing, to keep a reasonable and ade-
quate lookout for automobiles using the street 
and to use reasonable and ordinary care to 
keep out of the way of such automobiles. In 
this connection it was her duty to look and ob-
serve whether there were any automobiles in 
such close proximity as to affect her safety 
and to continue to keep such a reasonable 
and prudent lookout as was reasonably neces-
sary for her own protection. 
"2. You are instructed that if you find 
from the evidence that the deceased was cross-
ing the street at the time of the accident, or 
was commencing to cross the street and con-
tinued on, it was her duty to exercise ordi-
nary care to ascertain her surroundings and 
the vehicles upon the highway at said time 
and not to remain in a place of danger, or 
otherwise fail to exercise reasonable and or-
dinary care for her own safety. 
"3. You are instructed that a pedes-
trian crossing a roadway at any point other 
than within a marked crosswalk or within an 
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection should 
yield the right of way to all vehicles lawfully 
upon the highway. Therefore, it was the duty 
of said deceased to yield the right of way to 
vehicles upon the street if you find that she 
was crossing or commencing to cross the street 
under the above circumstances. 
"4. You are instructed that it is unlaw-
ful for any person to walk upon a roadway 
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. ''You are,. therefore, instructed that if 
you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
.. that the deceased failed to observe any of the 
. above rules .of Jaw respecting her conduct and 
. that. her failure proximately contributed to 
the happening of the collision then and in that 
event the plaintiffs herein would not be en-
. titled to recover for her death." 
The question is whether this instruction was 
proper in view· of the evidence that the deceased 
was· anywhere froni six·· to somewhat more· than 
fifteen feet on the highway at a point other than 
within a marked crosswalk or within an un1narked 
cross walk at an intersection and may have been 
directly in defend9-nt's lane of traffic. In a case 
directly on point, 'Barry, Bt al, v. Maddalena, et al, 
(Cal.) 146 P. 974, decided in 1944, ~he facts, as 
stated in the 'vords of the court, vvere: 
"About 11:30 P~M. on the night of July 
30th,, 1942; .defendant, Clem Maddalena, and 
his minor son, .Clemente, were proceeding 
northerly. iri the father's Chevrolet on U. S. 
Highway 101, with Clemente in the driver's 
. seat. The weather was clear of fog or cloud 
and t~e p~verpent was dry as they approached 
the city of Santa Marguerita. The concrete 
highway was. divided in the center by a white 
.. strip. Ori · each . side was a six foot smooth 
··shoulder. They were still in the open country 
'traveling. at about forty-five miles. per hour 
. when· another automobile Vvith glaring head-
lights, going southerly, passed then1. On ap-
proaching the southbOU11d vehicle, Clemente 
lowered the .. beam of his headlights. \Vithin 
12 
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less than six seconds after passing the south-
bound car, the Chevrolet collided with the de-
ceased. The left fender and lamp struck him, 
indicating that deceased was east of the high-
way's center. The collision was the first know-
ledge defendants had of the presence of any 
object on the pavement, notwithstanding both 
of them had been on the lookout just prior to 
the impact." 
The plaintiffs complained that there was no 
evidence justifying the submission of instructions 
having to do with contributory negligence. The 
court said: 
"Not only was the finding of Clemente's 
freedom from negligence justified, but the 
evidence warranted the implied finding of 
the contributory negligence of deceased. 
Whether deceased by his own negligent act 
caused his collision with the Chevrolet was 
a question for the jury. If deceased had been 
walking southward, he was presumptively 
negligent in violating the rule which requires 
that a pedestrian on the highway in the open 
country walk close to the left-hand edge. Ve-
hicle Code, Section 564, St. 1935, p. 188. If 
he had been northward bound, he should have 
been on the outside of the westly lane. Ibid. 
On the other hand, the jury may have deter-
mined that the deceased was attempting to 
cross from the west side to the east side of the 
highway at a point where there was no cross-
walk and without yielding the right of way. 
Two established facts warranted such deter-
mination ; ( 1 ) His position, when struck, in 
the easterly lane of the center strip; and 
(2) Neither defepdant saw him. If he did 
13 
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attempt to cross as the Chevrolet was ap-
proaching, he should have yielded the right 
of way and in failing to do so, he was negli-
gent. Sec. 562, Vehicle Code. Under the cir-
cumstances, a finding that such act contri-
buted to the accident is amply justified. It 
follows that if the jury found that the head-
lights of the Chevrolet did not comply with 
the rule requiring that its lighting beams 
have sufficient intensity to reveal a person 
at a distance of one hundred feet ahead, Sec. 
648, Vehicle Code, St. 1939, p. 1603, still 
upon other facts, the jury may properly have 
found that the negligence of deceased justi-
fied a denial of recovery." 
Speaking specifically of the instructions, the 
court said : · 
"The third assignment is that there was 
no evidence justifying defendants' proposed 
instructions 11, 12, and 14. No. 11 sets forth 
the provisions of Section 564, and declares 
that if deceased violated such provisions, he 
was negligent as a matter of law, and if such 
act was a proximate cause of the accident, 
plaintiff cannot recover. No. 12 recites (1) 
that the duty of a pedestrian to yield the right 
of way while crossing a highway at a point 
other than a crosswalk area may call for a 
higher degree of care than applied when he 
crosses at a regular crosswalk; ( 2) that if 
the deceased failed to exercise the degree of 
care of a reasonably prudent person in cross-
! ing at a point where he does not have the 
right of way, he was guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law; and ( 3) that if such negli-
gence was a proximate cause of the accident, 
plaintiffs cannot recover. No. 14 declared 
14 
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that the degree of care required of deceased 
was that of a reasonably prudent person un-
der similar circumstances; that a reasonably 
prudent person would have known that by 
virtue of the darkness and color of his cloth-
ing, it would be difficult for the motorist to 
observe him there; that therefore a greater 
degree of care was imposed upon the deceased 
under the circumstances if such were found 
to have existed. 
"Appellants do not say that the criticized 
instructions embody erroneous statements of 
law. Their claims are that there is no evi-
dence justifying 11, and that in attempting 
to apply the law by 14, the court effectually 
told the jury that they might find deceased 
had violated Eection 564, although no wit-
nesses.had seen him before the impact. 
"In making such claims, appellants are 
in error. Both 11 and 12 were given because 
of the proof that deceased, while in the open 
country and in the easterly lane of the high-
way, was struck by the left lamp of the 
·Chevrolet, proceeding northerly. No. 12 is a 
fair attempt to apply Section 564 to the very 
facts in evidence. Instruction 10 quoted and 
correctly applied Section 562. 
"Such instructions were properly g·iven to 
aid the jury in the event they should deter-
mine from the evidence that the deceased in 
violation of two code sections was either cross-
ing the highway or walking in defendant's 
lane of travel. The fact that there were no 
living witnesses to the impact was no reason 
for rejecting the instructions. The physical 
facts were sufficient to prove that deceased 
15 
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was about two feet east of the center strip. 
If __ he stopped east just after the southbound 
car passed, Clemente's vision was at that in-
stant dimmed. The circumstances warranted 
the instructions." 
In an Oregon case which appears at 284 P. (2) 
1041, wherein a petition for a rehearing was denied 
at 286-P. (2) 656, the name of the case being Lemons 
v. Holland, a judgment was returned for the death 
of a p~destrian who was struck by an automobile 
during the nighttime at a point two. feet from the 
center line of the highway in the motorist's lane of 
traffic. The Supreme Court reversed the case with 
directions to enter judgment for the defendant. 
Quoting from the case which appears at 286 P. (2) 
656, the court had this to say about the physical 
evidence: 
"As we originally pointed out, the phy-
sical facts in this case demonstrate without 
any question that the impact occurred at least 
three feet north of the center line of the high-
way; the broken glass and radio aerial lay on 
and to the south of the center line. How this 
debris got there, no on~ knows, nor could 
·know, except that it \Vas thrown by and from 
the rapidly moving vehicle at some moment 
following the impact. When decedent's body 
was thrown from contact with the car, it was 
thrown in a diagonal direction (southerly 
and westerly) to the south edge of the pav:e-
ment, although the automobile kept moving 
in a direct line westerly. It n1ay be that the 
glass and radio aerial were also so thrown. 
16 
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Many speculative conjectures might be made 
as to just what happened and how it hap-
pened, with one guess as good as another, but 
actions for negligence are not determined by 
mere guess work." 
As to whether or not the deceased was guilty 
of contributory negligence under these circum-
stances, the court said, still quoting from 286 P. (2) 
656: 
"However, under the established facts of 
this case, we are firmly convinced that de-
cedent was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. 16 Am. Jur. 207, Sec. 302, 
supra. There is no evidence whatever respect-
ing the actions of decedent immediately prior 
to the impact. All that is known is that at 
the instant of impact, he was perhaps in an 
upright position on the high\vay, approxim-
ately three feet north of the center line there-
on. In the light of the known facts and appli-
cable law of this case, and in the total absence 
of evidence, direct or circumstantial, to ex-
plain or justify decedent's presence on the 
pavement at the time and place he was struck 
by the rapidly moving vehicle, if indeed it 
would be possible to give any reasonable ex-
planation, the conclusion is inescapable that 
decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. The presumption of due care cannot 
save him from that finding as, under the 
known facts and circumstances of this case, 
that presumption is overcome as a matter 
of law. On this straight stretch of highway 
in wide open country where the headlights 
of approaching automobiles could be seen for 
long distances, it is inconceivable that a 
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pedestrian could be hit by one traveling in a 
straight line on its own side of the road if he 
exercised even the slightest degree of care 
for his own safety." 
In a Washington case, Allen v. Hart, 201 P. 
(2) 145, (1948) the facts and holding of the court 
were 
"Claude Eugene Allen died as a result 
of a collision with an automoblie driven by 
. D. E. Hart. A suit by the administratrix of 
Allen's estate was commenced under the pro-
visions of our wrongful death statute, Rem. 
, Rev. Stat. Sees. 183 and 183-1. A substantial 
verdict was returned against Mr. Hart and 
his wife. From a judgment entered on that 
verdict, the Harts have appealed. 
"The respondents' theory of the case, 
supported by disinterested· witnesses, was that 
Mr. Allen was crossing the street at an un-
marked crosswalk when he was struck and 
fatally injured. The appellants testified that 
Mr. Allen was not in the crosswalk when he 
was hit. The locus of the collision was the 
most important single factor of the accident, 
for upon it depended the vital question of 
who had the right of way. 
"The trial court properly instructed that 
if Mr. Allen was on a crosswalk, he had the 
right of way, but refused to give an instruc-
tion to the effect that if he was crossing the 
street at other than the crosswalk, it was his 
obligation to yield the right of way to all ve-
hicles on the roadway. This denied the appel-
lants' right to have· their theory of the case 
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presented to the jury and was prejudicial 
error. 
The respondents' only attempted justi-
fication of the court's failure to instruct upon 
the appellants' theory of the case was that 
(a) Mr. Allen's having died without regain-· 
ing consciousness following his injury, there 
was a presumption that he exercised due care 
for his own safety; (b) all the disinterested 
testimony was that he was in the crosswalk 
when he was hit; and (3) the interested testi-
mony of the appellants that Mr. Allen was 
not in the crosswalk was not sufficient to re-
move the presumption of due care, which is 
patently fallacious. There is no presumption 
of due care in this case, numerous witnesses, 
interested and disinterested, having testified 
as to how and where the collision occurred." 
The evidence in Rios v. Benr;~ett, (Cal.) 200 P. 
(2) 73, decided in 1948, was that decedent was 
struck when approximately ten feet from the south 
curbline of Fifth Street and in the south traffic 
lane, used by vehicles traveling in an easterly di-
rection. He was thrown in the air by the impact, 
carried several feet to the east, and died before the 
ambulance arrived. There was a marked pedestrian 
crosswalk crossing Fifth Street on the west side of 
Cabrera Street, but none between Cabrera and Ra-
mona Streets where decedent attempted to cross. 
The trial court in that case did hold that it was error 
to give an instruction to the effect that if deceased 
looked towards defendant's automobile before he 
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stepped out onto the street and failed to see it, he 
was guilty of negligence if defendant's automobile 
was in his immediate vicinity and in plain sight, 
where there was no evidence that the deceased pedes-
trian looked or did not look before he stepped out 
onto the street. However, the court held that the 
giving of this instruction was not prejudicial and 
then went on to say: 
"The jury was fully instructed as to the 
duty of decedent while crossing the street. 
The law placed upon him the continuing duty 
to exercise ordinary care and to avoid an 
accident after he left the sidewalk and at all 
times while crossing the street. (Citations 
given) . The instructions when read as a whole 
left the question of contributory negligence 
on the part of the decedent for the determina-
tion of the jury as a question of fact. There 
was .substantial evidence that the decedent 
crossed the street into the south lane of traf-
fic without taking adequate precautions be-
fore doing so, and that he either did not look 
to the west for approaching cars, or if he did 
so look, he failed to see what was in plain 
sight, and there was no reason why he could 
not have paused to let the car pass by and 
yield the right of way as required by law. 
The implied finding of the jury that the de-
ceased was guilty of contributory negligence 
which proximately contributed to his injury 
and death is amply supported by the evidence. 
(Citations given). And its finding under all 
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In a Montana case cited in appelants' brief, 
Garrison v. Trowbridge, 177 P. (2) 464, the acci-
dent occurred at an intersection. The specific in-
truction objected to was to the effect that, "You 
are instructed that all traffic, including pedestrians; 
must, when they approach an intersection of a city 
street in the City of Great Falls, and Second Avenue 
North, the same being a through street, stop and 
look before entering such intersection for the pur-
pose of crossing the avenue." The court held that 
there was no evidence that the deceased in this 
~ase did not stop before entering the intersection 
and that, therefore, the giving of that instruction 
was In error. 
We do not disagree with the decision in the 
Montana case, nor the other cases cited in appel-
lants' brief to the effect that instructions must be 
predicated upon evidence in the case, and in the 
absence of evidence, instructions should not be given. 
However, we feel that this is not the situation in 
the case before the court. The evidence in this case 
is that the decedent was on the highway at the time 
she was struck, and that she may have been as far 
as slightly in excess of fifteen feet and directly in 
the defendant's lane of traffic, that being the out-
side lane for southbound cars. This is evidence, and it 
is sufficient to support a finding that the deceased 
v;as guilty of contributory negligence· which proxi-
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mately caused her own death if believed by the jury. 
This being the case, the instructions as to the de-
ceased's right to be on the highway were properly 
. g1ven. 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DECE-
DENT WAS PRESUMED TO BE EXERCISING DUE 
CARE AT THE TIME OF HER DEATH. 
The plaintiffs and appellants' assertion that 
the deceased was entitled to a presumption that she 
'vas exercising due care for her own safety and that 
the jury should have been so instructed is based on 
the premise that there was no evidence that the 
deceased was guilty of any negligence which the 
jury might reasonably find was a proximate cause 
of her death. Since the premise upon which it rests 
is erroneous, as we have already seen, the general 
proposition itself must also fail. The situation is 
discussed in the three cases cited in appellants' 
brief, Tuttle v. P.l.E., 242 P. ( 2) 764, --------------Utah 
______________ ; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 249 P. ( 2) 213, _____________ _ 
Utah ____________ ~_·; and -Mecham v. Allen, 262 P. (2) 
285, 1 Utah (2) 79. It is also discussed in another 
case, Cox v. Thompson, 254 P. ( 2) 104 7, _____________ _ 
Utah ______________ ~ -
This Court held in Tuttle v. P.I.E., supra, that 
the presumption was overcome where the jury could 
reasonably find from the evidence that the decedent 
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turned. his car suddenly and without worning. In 
that case the Court held: 
"Here the jury could reasonably find 
1 from the evidence that the decedent was driv-
ing his car toward the south and turned his 
car suddenly and without warning into the 
course of the tractor-trailor when it was too 
late to avoid an accident, and in so doing, 
he did not use core for his own safety. So the 
presumption was thereby destroyed, and in-
structing the jury thereon could only con-
fuse, rather than enlighten them, but this 
was not prejudicial." 
Plaintiffs contended in Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 
supra: 
"That the trial court's conclusion that 
the deceased was contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law was erroneous since the pre-
sumption that he was using due care for his 
own safety was not rebutted by the defendant, 
and (2) that under the facts the question of 
(a) contributory negligence, and (b) whether 
deceased's negligence, if any shown, was a 
proximate cause of the collision, properly 
were matters for the jury." 
The action arose out of an intersectional col-
lision between defendant's taxi cab and a bicycle 
ridden by plaintiff's decedent while it was dark. 
There was no lamp on the bicycle as required by 
a City Ordinance and a State Statute, and some 
other evidence of negligence on the deceased's part. 
The Court, while holding that the question of wheth-
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er or not the deceased was guilty of contributory 
negligence should have been submitted to the jury, 
also held that the presumption of due care on the de-
ceased's part had been overcome by the aforemen-
tioned evidence of negligence and no longer re1nai:ned 
in the case. Justice Wade in a concurring opinion 
said: 
"The presumption that the person in-
jured used due care for his own safety has 
no bearing on this case. Such presumption 
merely places on the adversary the burden of 
going forward with the evidence and making 
a prima facie case on that issue. It disappears 
form the case as soon as sufficient ev1uence 
is produced from which the fact trier could 
reasonably find that the deceased failed to 
use due care, although it is sometimes argued 
and the language of some decisions seems to 
indicate that express eye vvritness testimony of 
the actions of the favored party at the time 
in question is necessary in order to overcon1e 
such presumptions. Such is not the case where 
the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence may be overcome by circumstantial 
evidence, for a prima facie case can be es-
tablished by circumstantial evidence the same 
as by direct testimony. This is the Thayeriat 
theory subscribed by Wigmore, and in this 
kind of a case by Morgan, and adopted by the 
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evi-
dence, and apparently approved by this Court 
by a long line of cases.· 
"From the evidence produced in this 
case, the jury could reasonably find that, de-
cedent rode his bicycle into an intersection 
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with a through highway and a stop sign 
against him during the nighttime, without 
the statutory or ordinance required lights 
and without ascertaining that defendant's cab 
was approaching so nearly as to constitute 
an immediate hazard until it was too late to 
avoid the collision, and in so doing, he was 
guilty of negligence which proximately caused 
or contributed to causing the accident and his 
death. Such being the case, the presumption 
that he used due care for his own safety has 
no effect on this case." 
"There is another reason why this pre-
sumption does not affect the result in this 
case. I!ere the defendant had the burden of 
persuading the trier of the facts that decedent 
was guilty of contributory negligence which 
proximately caused his death. Such being de-
fendant's burden, he, without the presump-
tion has the burden of not only going forward 
with the evidence, but also of persuading the 
trier of decedant's fault. So, since defendant 
not only has the burden of going forward 
with the evidence, but of persuading the jury 
on that question, such presumption would not 
affect the defendant's burden at all." 
The presumption was held to be overcome in 
Cox v. Thompson, supra, by evidence that the de-
cedent, dressed in dark clothes, while walking across 
a poorly lighted highway at night, walked directly 
into the path of an automobile being drive by the 
defendant. The court said: 
"If the presumption that a person in a 
place of danger exercises due care for his own 
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safety applies in this case, it will be ex-
tinguished if the evidence properly sustains 
the finding that decedant was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law." 
Mecham v. Allen, supra, was an action for the 
death of a motorist and injuries sustained by his 
wife and children in a collision between motorist's 
automobile and a tractor-trailer owned by one de-
fendant and driven by another. It appeared that 
the left front of the automobile had collided on an 
incline curve with the left side of the tractor-trailer 
just behind the cab. There was a conflict in the evi-
dence as to which automobile was on its proper side 
of the highway at the time of the accident. The court 
held that under these circumstances, it was error 
to give an instruction as follows: 
"You are instructed that, until the con-
trary is proven, there is a presumption that 
the deceased, Thomas Udell Mecham, was ex-
ercising due and proper care for the protec-
tion of his person and the preservation of his 
life, at the time of the accident; this presump-
tion arises from the instinct of self-preserva-
tion and the disposition of man to avoid per-
sonal harm. This presumption is not conclu-
sive but is a matter to be considered by the 
jury in a connection with all other facts and 
circumstances in the case in determining 
whether or not the deceased, Thomas Udell 
Mecham, was guilty of contributory negli-
gence at the time of the accident." 
Holding that the defendants had made a prima 
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facie case that decedent's car was on the wrong side 
of the road at the time of the accident, but not so 
strong that it would be unreasonable, in view of all 
the evidence, to find the facts against them, the 
court went on to say: 
"A presumption deals with a rule of law 
which requires the trier of the facts to assume 
the existence of one fact or a set of facts (here-
in called the presumed facts) from the estab-
lishment of another fact or set of facts (herein 
called the basic facts). Unless the basic facts 
are conclusively shown to exist, that question, 
if material, should be submitted to the jury. 
* * * From the basic fact that a human be-
ing was accidentally killed, a presumption 
arises which requires the trier of the facts 
to assume the presumed facts, and that de-
cedent u~ed due care for his ovvn safety, in 
the absence of a prima facie showing to the 
contrary, but in this kind of a presumption 
upon the making of such showing, the pre-
sumption disappears from and becomes wholly 
inoperative in the case, and the trial from 
then on should proceed exactly the same as 
though n opresumption ever existed, or had 
any effect on the case. 
"Such a presumption deals only with the 
burden of going forward with or the produc-
tion of evidence. The question of whether a 
prima facie case has been made is the same 
here as in all other cases, a question for the 
court and not the jury to determine. It is es-
tablished whenever sufficient evidence is pro-
duced from which its existence could be 
reasonably found. Of course, it is immaterial 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which party produces such evidence. If the 
court concludes that a prima facie case has 
been made, it should submit the question of 
the existence of the presumed facts to the 
jury on the evidence without commenting or 
mentioning to them that there was or is such 
a presumption. If the court concludes that no 
prima facie showing of the non-existence of 
the presumed facts has been made, he should 
direct the jury to assume the existence of the 
presumed facts, or if such facts are detern1in-
ative of the whole case, he should direct a 
verdict in accordance therewith. 
* * * * * * 
"Since defendants' evidence was clearly 
sufficient to make the prima facie case, the 
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence 
which proximately caused the accident, the 
presumption was eliminated from the case, 
and it was error for the court to instruct the 
jury on that question. But was it prejudicial? 
·With the presumption eliminated, the defen-
dants still had the burden of persuading the 
jury that decedent was guilty of contributory 
negligence which proximately caused the acci-
dent. The jury was elsewhere so instructed. 
Thus defendants not only had the burden of 
going forward with the evidence, but of per-
suading the jury on that issue. So in cases 
where the questio11 of proving contributory 
negligence is involved, this presumption can 
never of any aid to the representatives of 
the deceased, beca11se their opponent without 
the presumption has the burden of persuad-
ing the jury that he was guilty of such negli-
gence, which is a greater burden than and 
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So we see that; since the defendant in this type 
of a case has the burden of proving contributory neg-
ligence or of proving facts on which contributory 
negligence might reasonably be found, which burden 
is greater than would be imposed upon him by the 
requirement that he rebut the presumption that the 
deceased exercised due care; there is a question as 
to whether or not the jury should ever be instructed 
in regard to this presumption. The presumption, that 
the deceased exercised due care for his own safety, 
appears therefore to be a rule of evidence to guide 
the court in trying the case. That is, the court as-
sumes that the deceased exercised due care for his 
own safety until that presumption has been rebutted 
by a prima facie case to the contrary. If no such 
prima facie case is made out and the facts conclu-
sively show negligence on the part of the other 
party, the court would be authorized, relying upon 
that presumption, to direct the verdict against the 
other party. If no such prima facie case to the con-
trary is made out, but there exists a question of 
whether or not the other party is negligent, the court 
then, relying on the presumption, might submit the 
question of the negligence of the other party to the 
jury at the same time instructing the jury to as-
sume the facts established by the presumption. 
Where, however, a prima facie case to the contrary 
is made out, the presumption disappears and the 
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case is tried as though the presumption never ex-
isted. Under these circumstances, the presumption 
could be of no aid to the representatives of the de-
ceased, since the other party has the burden of prov-
ing by a prponderance of the evidence that the de-
ceased did not exercise due care for his own saftey, 
which is a greater degree of proof than is required 
to rebut the presumption. 
In this case, the defendant made out a prima 
facie case that the deceased was not exercising due 
care for her own safety, or to state it otherwise, 
was contributorily negligent, by their evidence that 
the deceased was on the highway at a point other 
than a marked crosswalk or an un1narked crosswalk 
at an intersection and may have been directly in the 
defendant's lane of traffic at the time she was 
struck. It was not, therefore, error for the Court 
to fail to instruct the jury that the deceased was 
presumed to be exercising due care for her own 
safety. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury's verdict in this case may be justified 
upon a number of assumptions as to what they may 
have found. There is some evidence, in view of the 
mysterious circumstances surrounding her death-
the fact that she had no reason to be in the place 
where she died, and the goings on in the gray Buick 
automobile which may have returned to the scene 
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of the accident-that the deceased did not meet her 
death by reason of any act on the part of the defen-
dant. The jury could have reasonably found that the 
defendant was not guilty of negligence in failing to 
see the deceased upon the highway at the time and 
place of the accident, since the area was very poorly 
lighted, the deceased \vas dressed in dark clothing, 
and the defendant's attention had voluntarily been 
distracted from the road immediately prior to the 
accident by an object apparently throw by or from 
the passing gray Buick automobile. The jury could 
have also found that the decedent was guilty of 
negligence which was a proximate cause of her own 
death by reason of her being upon the highway at 
the time and place of the collision. 
There were no eye witnesses to the collision 
and it is not known what the deceased was doing on 
the highway at the time of her death. However, the 
defendant is entitled to the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn frorn the fact that she was on the high-
way. As was said in Olsen v. W arwood, 255 P. ( 2) 
725, __________________ Utah __________________ , cited in appellants' 
brief, Vlhere the jury was instructed that it should 
return a verdict in favor of the defendant if it found 
from the evidence that the plaintiff, after having 
been discharged from a school bus, ran toward the 
side of the bus near the right wheels at a time and 
place when the defendant could not see him, in the 
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absence of any direct testimony that the plaintiff 
had done so: 
"There is no testimony in the record stat-
ing that plaintiff ran or walked into the side 
of defendant's bus. Defendant, however, did 
testify that he brought the bus to a complete 
stop; that the children, including plaintiff, 
were permitted to disembark from the right 
front door in safety; that he observed the 
plaintiff a good five feet out and away from 
the bus before the ·vehicle was put back into 
. motion; that the vehicle proceeded on and 
away from the plaintiff's position; and that 
he observed no child or person close enough 
.to plaintiff to push or throw him under the 
wheels. This testimony, along with the ad-
mitted fact that plaintiff was run over by 
the right rear wheels of the bus is sufficient 
to support an inference that plaintiff ran or 
walked towards the bus after it regained 
forward motion. No other inference can be 
drawn from defendant's testimony stating 
plaintiff was five feet away from the vehicle, 
was not thrown or pushed under the vehicle 
by a third person or object; was not driven 
into by the vehicle; and yet was run over by 
the rear wheels of such conveyance. The in-
struction.permitting the.jury to make such an 
inference was not based on non-evidentiary 
facts, nor did it permit a finding based on 
surmise, conjecture, or speculation. Such in-
struction, though not a model one, under the 
facts before the trial court, did allow a logical 
and reasonable finding to be made which was 
based on testimony properly in evidence.'' 
Instruction No. 7 in this case did not presume 
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to find any of the facts but only instrcted the jury 
in a general way on the deceased's right to be on 
the highway and her duties to use care for her own 
safety while on the highway, should the jury find 
that she was either attempting to cross the high-
way or was walking upon the highway, which are 
the only reasonable and logical inferences which 
could be drawn from the fact that she was on the 
highway at the time she was struck, unless we pre-
sume that she was thrown onto the highway or 
dropped on the highway by some third person or 
persons, in which event the defendant would not be 
responsible, and the instruction would not, there-
fore, be prejudicial. 
The presumption that the deceased was using 
due care for her own safety at the time of the ac-
cident was overcome by the evidence in this case 
from which the jury might reasonably have found 
that the deceased was giulty of contributory negli-
gence which was a proximate cause of her own 
death. 
Even if we assume that such presumption was 
still in the case, the jury was otherwise instructed 
by the Court in Instruction No. 2 that the defendant 
had the burden of showing the deceased guilty of 
contributory negligence, and that such negligence 
was a proximate cause of her death, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, which duty was greater 
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than that of merely rebutting the presumption, so 
that the failure to give the instruction as to the pre-
sumption, if error, would not be prejudicial. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury in 
this case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON 
and DON J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
· · 520 Continental Bank Building 
. Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
